An outbreak of chickenpox with spread to patients and staff on the isolation ward of a British field hospital during the Gulf war is described. The implications for the design and operation of field hospital isolation units should transmissible biological warfare agents be encountered in any future conflict are discussed.
Introduction
Chickenpox is a highly contagious disease which is spread predominantly by droplets from the respiratory tract and also by virus present in the vesicular fluid'. The characteristic rash makes clinical diagnosis easy and rapid, permitting early identification of secondary cases. This, coupled with the short incubation period of 14-17 days", makes chickenpox a useful marker disease for the spread of infection within a field unit.
This tented hospital deployed to the Gulf for Operation Granby in late October 1990, and was fully operational as a 400 bed unit 4 weeks later. The hospital subsequently expanded to 600 beds in January. A separate isolation ward was established in early November, primarily for cases of gastroenteritis. An outbreak of chickenpox with secondary spread to staff and patients occurred during the early part of this operation.
Transmissible biological warfare agents were not used during this war, however, this observation has important implications for the design and operation of field hospitals, both military and civilian, should such an agent be encountered in a future conflict.
Description of the outbreak
This study is a retrospective analysis of the case notes of all 21 patients admitted to 33 Field Hospital with a clinical diagnosis of chickenpox between mid-November 1990 and mid-February 1991. The diagnosis Was based on the appearance ofa cropping,centripetally distributed rash consisting of vesicles which became dry crusts over 2-4 days. Nine patients described a prodromal illness of one to two days characterized by headache and general malaise. Neither serology nor electron microscopy of vesicle fluid were performed in view of the classical rash. Six of these patients, all of whom had been in the Gulffor at least 4 weeks at the time of presentation, appear to have contracted chickenpox from inpatients in the hospital. Amongst these secondary cases, three nurses from the isolation Correspondence to; Dr N C Hepburn, University Department of Dermatology, Level 4, Lauriston Building, Royal Infirmary, Edinburgh EH3 9YW ward presented having cared for infected patients. Two further patients had been inpatients on the isolation ward with diarrhoea some 2 weeks prior to their readmission with chickenpox. During their first admission patients with chickenpox had been on the ward and in neither case was there any record of other cases of chickenpox in either of their separate units. The final case had worked in the hospital laundry for four weeks prior to her admission. She had never visited the isolation ward, and could not recall any recent contact with a case.
Description of the isolation ward
The tented isolation ward contained 61 beds within an area of 40 m 2 • Each bed was separate from its neighbour to the side by a gap of 0.35 m. Patients were confined to the ward and meals brought up from the hospital kitchen in containers. There were no cubicles to segregate patients who, therefore, tended to socialize. The ward had two sinks, one for ablutions and another for cutlery. A block of four fibreglass 'thunderbox' toilets was placed immediately outside and its use reserved for isolation ward patients. All dirty linen was placed first in alginate bags and then in plastic sacks before dispatch to the hospital laundry. The ward was staffed by 24 nurses and combat medical technicians.
Discussion
The spread of chickenpox to both staff and patients within the isolation ward illustrates the difficulties of controlling infectious disease in a field hospital. Most of the secondary cases described probably resulted from droplet spread. In the case of the laundry worker transmission by fomites may have occurred, although transmission from a casual social contact with a pre-symptomatic' patient cannot be ruled out. Such contacts have not resulted in any other cases in a unit of over 700 individuals.
Civilian studies suggest that at least 90% of young adults are immune to chickenpox'; a similarly high level of herd immunity could be expected in the military community. As 12.5% of the isolation ward staffcontracted the disease it is reasonable to conclude that most, if not all, of those who were susceptible were infected. Far more secondary cases would have resulted if the herd immunity had been low, illustrating the hazards of nursing contagious diseases in such an open unit.
We recommend that the isolation wards of field hospitals should be sub-divided so that diseases of a like nature can be nursed together. This could be achieved by using smaller tents leading offa corridor, each tent having dedicated toilet and ablution facilities. Considerable attention must be paid to the 0141-07681911 120721-03/$02. 00/0 © 1991 The Royal Society of Medicine use and labelling of alginate bags to prevent infection of laundry workers. As far as possible staff nursing a particular disease should have natural immunity or active immunization to the disease in question. Although, such immunization is impractical for many enteric diseases strict hygiene measures should prevent infection. Gowns and masks should be worn by staff caring for patients with contagious diseases to which they do not have adequate immunity. Intensive education of staff will enhance the efficiency of all these measures.
Iftransmissible biological warfare agents are anticipated during any future operation then considerable attention and resources must be devoted to the provision of isolation facilities within field medical units. These can be supplemented by a programme of immunization to likely agents carried out sufficiently far in advance to achieve an adequate antibody response. This may mean maintaining immunity in some staff during peacetime. 
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